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ABSTRACT
Christine Korsgaard argues for the moral status of animals and our 
obligations to them. She grounds this obligation on the notion that 
we share a common identity, our animal nature, with them and that 
animal pain represents a public reason that binds us; nevertheless, 
her distinctive attempt to enlist Kantian arguments to account for our 
obligations to animals has a startling implication that she fails to ad-
equately consider: that we have direct duties to plants as well. 
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In The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard argues 
for the moral status of animals and our obligations to them. 
She grounds this obligation on the notion that we share a com-
mon identity, our animal nature, with them and that animal pain 
represents a public reason that binds us; nevertheless, her dis-
tinctive attempt to enlist Kantian arguments to account for our 
obligations to animals has a startling implication that she fails 
to adequately consider: that we have direct duties to plants as 
well. In the first part of this paper, I will revisit Korsgaard’s at-
tempt to justify our obligations to animals; then in part two, I 
will examine her account of our indirect duties to plants. Next, 
I will show that her argument for our having direct duties to 
animals actually justifies similar obligations to plants as well, 
not just in regards to them, and finally I will consider and rebut 
her objection to my argument.  
Obligations to Animals
According to Korsgaard, animals value themselves; this is 
just what it means to be a living thing. She says, “A living thing 
is an entity whose nature it is to preserve and maintain its phys-
ical identity. It is a law to itself. When something it is doing 
is a threat to that identity and perception reveals that fact, the 
animal finds that it must reject what it is doing and do some-
thing else instead.  In that case, it is in pain” (1996, 150). She 
argues that pain is the “unreflective rejection of a threat to your 
identity. So pain is the perception of a reason, and that is why it 
seems normative” (1996, 150). When we see an animal in pain, 
we are also perceiving a reason that the animal has to change its 
condition, and this reason is public, something that has norma-
tive import for us as reflective rational beings. She argues that 
the animal’s cry of pain obligates you just as someone calling 
out to you in your language can obligate you to listen: “You 
can no more hear the cries of an animal as mere noise than you 
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can the words of a person” (1996, 153). Pain, in this sense, is a 
public language that we share with animals, a sign that points 
to reasons that we both are able to perceive.  
Korsgaard argues that we must respond compassionately to 
the cries of an animal because we must act consistently (in a 
Kantian sense), valuing sentient nature wherever we find it.  In 
The Sources of Normativity, she puts it this way: 
I first point out to you that your animal nature is a fun-
damental form of identity on which the normativity of 
your human identity, your moral identity, depends. It 
is not just as human but considered as sensible, con-
sidered as an animal, that you value yourself and are 
your own end. And this further stretch of reflection re-
quires a further stretch of endorsement. If you don’t 
value your animal nature, you can value nothing. So 
you must endorse its value. And the reasons and obli-
gations to which your animal identity gives rise are not 
private reasons. However you bind yourself by those 
reasons, you can bind and be bound by others as well.  
So the reasons of other animals are also reasons for you 
(1996, 152-153).
Thus the reasons we have to value our sentient identities are 
public in nature; that which is a reason for you is also a reason 
for me—hence my obligation to you. Like Kant’s Formula of 
Humanity, just as you can recognize your own humanity in oth-
er rational beings, wherever you also find animal nature, you 
will find a common identity, something someone shares with 
you and something that can obligate you.   
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In her article, “Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and our Du-
ties to Animals,” she describes our common animal nature as 
an end in itself: “In taking ourselves to be ends-in-ourselves we 
legislate that the natural good of a creature who matters to itself 
is the source of normative claims. Animal nature is an end-in-
itself, because our own legislation makes it so. And this is why 
we have duties to the other animals” (2004, 103). 
Indirect Duties to Plants
On the face of it, Korsgaard’s account of obligations to ani-
mals seems plausible, but what does she have to say about oth-
er forms of life, specifically plants? According to Korsgaard, 
plants do not share the same status as rational and nonrational 
animals: “Since a plant is not conscious, being a plant is not a 
way of being someone, so it is not a way of being someone that 
we share with them” (1996, 156). She thinks that a plant’s lack 
of awareness, its lack of mattering to itself, disqualifies it from 
obligating us.
On the other hand, Korgaard does recognize that we have 
duties in regards to plants; she asks, “Is it crazy to say that 
there is something amiss with someone who destroys plant life 
wantonly, or who can see a plant drooping but still alive with-
out wanting to give it a drink? Such a person shows a lack of 
reverence of life which is the basis of all value” (1996, 156). 
However, she claims that this is not an obligation to plants di-
rectly. This is Kant’s view, as Allen Wood describes it, of our 
duties to both animals and plants:  
Kant argues that our duty to cherish and promote what 
is beautiful in nonrational nature irrespective of its 
usefulness, and to behave with kindness and gratitude 
toward animals, are really duties to promote our own 
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moral perfection by behaving in ways that encourage a 
morally good disposition in ourselves. Kant claims that 
appreciation for the beauty of nature, by awakening in 
us the disposition to value something apart from its 
usefulness for our ends, prepares the way for a genu-
inely moral disposition in our behavior toward rational 
beings (1998, 194).  
This means, regarding plants, that Kant’s duty not to harm 
plants is an indirect duty, not a direct duty to value plant life 
for its own sake, but to value it for our sake because it makes 
us better people. Kant’s view does not permit unbridled ex-
ploitation of nonrational life for our own pleasures, but it also 
does not consider plant life as intrinsically valuable. Korsgaard 
agrees with Kant that our duties to plants are indirect, but she 
disagrees with him regarding our duties to animals. However, 
she may be overlooking an aspect of her argument that would 
support the view that our duties to plants and animals are the 
same, that we have direct duties to both. 
Direct Duties to Plants
Korsgaard’s argument for our direct duties to animals de-
pends on two things: our shared identity and the reasons it gives 
rise to, but this justification would also work for plants as well. 
First, we share a common identity with plants—our biological 
nature; second, our biological nature gives rise to reasons too.   
Regarding our common identity, we are not only a part of 
the animal kingdom, but we also share biological characteris-
tics in common with plant life.  This could be called (follow-
ing Aquinas) a vegetative, (or following Aristotle) nutritive, or 
reproductive nature. Without this principle of life—the aspect 
that is concerned with nutrition, growth, and reproduction—
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there would be no animals or rational human beings who could 
concern themselves with higher principles such as appetite, ac-
tion, or reason. In fact, there would be no Kantian basis for 
duty at all since obligation is self-legislating through rational 
autonomy, and this is dependent (at least empirically) on there 
being human biological organisms. Therefore, if animal nature 
is necessary for rational human nature, then so is biological 
nature in general.  
A living thing, under Korsgaard’s conception, “is an entity 
whose nature it is to preserve and maintain its physical identity” 
(1996, 150). While describing animals, she invokes Aristotle: 
“Aristotle thought that a living thing is a thing with a special 
kind of form. A living thing is so designed as to maintain and 
reproduce itself. It has what we might call a self-maintaining 
form. So it is its own end; its job is just to keep on being what it 
is. Its business in life is to preserve its own identity. And its or-
gans and activities are arranged to that end” (1996, 149). When 
an animal experiences pain, it perceives a reason to act to pre-
serve its identity. For example, when an animal feels hungry, 
it perceives a reason to eat, being that if it does not eat, it will 
die. The animal does not know this reason, but it does perceive 
it, nonetheless.  Korsgaard applies a similar description to plant 
life: “Plants, although not sensible, are in a way organized to be 
their own end. Like animals they have a self-maintaining form. 
And it is also true that we find it natural to use the language 
of reason and action about plants. We say that a plant needs 
water, that it turns towards the light, even that it is not happy 
in that window and must be moved to another” (1996, 156). 
Here and elsewhere, Korsgaard describes living things in the 
language of final causes, as having ends. Although some of this 
language clearly crosses over into metaphor (plant emotions 
for example) Korsgaard evidently thinks that a common prin-
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ciple of life can be ascribed to both animals and plants, since 
both “are organized to their own ends” and “have natures that 
aim at preserving their own identity.”   
Plants are not conscious, so any sense that can be made of 
the claim that plants have reasons must not include the notion 
of awareness. Nevertheless, it seems as though Korsgaard is 
consistently applying the Aristotelian conception of living 
things here. Although plants do not share perceptual capacities 
with animals, it is not inconceivable to think that they are orga-
nized on the basis of final causes; for example, Thomas Aqui-
nas, commenting on Aristotle, agrees that a rational mind is not 
necessary to act for an end. Everything in nature, by its action 
or movement, tends to an end (Summa Theologica, I-II, 1,2). 
As Korsgaard writes, “We do not think of plants as perceiving 
and pursuing their good, and yet like animals they are essen-
tially self-maintaining beings and in that sense are oriented to-
ward their own good. And they exhibit a certain responsiveness 
to the environment, to light and moisture” (2004, 106). Plants 
spread their roots and photosynthesize on the basis of this end, 
and if they do not do this, they will die. “Since the function of 
a plant…is to maintain itself, it is the plant’s own needs, not 
our needs, that are affected by things that enable or interfere 
with its functioning. A plant therefore ‘has a good’ in a slightly 
deeper sense than a [human artifact] does, since what is ‘good 
for it’ is more authentically good for itself” (2004, 102).  Thus, 
plants have identities, just not in a conscious sense, which does 
not seem to be a difficulty for Korsgaard’s model. If conscious 
self-awareness were necessary for having an identity, then it 
is not clear that even animals would have the status that Kors-
gaard needs for her argument to go through. Granted animals 
are more conscious than plants, they are not self-aware in the 
same way as human beings are. Nevertheless, Korsgaard can 
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extend direct duties to animals because, I claim, it is not aware-
ness that is fundamental to her model, it is having reasons based 
on a metaphysical identity, or the having of an esse. 
Attributing reasons to plants in this way depends on a 
strongly teleological conception of life. Nevertheless, this ap-
pears to be Korsgaard’s actual view toward living things in 
general and why her model, in my view, entails direct duties 
to plants. J. Skidmore interprets her model in a similar fash-
ion: “Korsgaard’s discussion seems to lay great emphasis on 
a teleological conception of life, suggesting that living things 
are, by their very nature, oriented toward certain goals or ends, 
such as self-preservation” (2001, 548). If we grant her this con-
troversial conception of life, then we seem to be faced with the 
fact that being one’s own end is not limited to human or animal 
life, but would even extend to plant life. 
But does having ends mean having reasons in the needed 
sense? Skidmore, at least, is skeptical: “Does it follow that 
plants have reasons to pursue such ends? It is hard to imagine 
what this could mean. Plants simply are not the kinds of things 
that can have reasons to do anything at all” (2001, 548). Under 
our modern conception of having a reason, it seems implausible 
to ascribe reason to anything incapable of acting for reasons in 
a deliberative sense. Nevertheless, in the rich teleological con-
ception of life present in Korsgaard’s writing, it makes sense 
to conflate having ends with having reasons. This is apparent 
in Korsgaard’s discussion of animal reason: “Suppose for in-
stance that [this] animal needs nourishment. It perceives that 
by getting hungry. It finds this unpleasant and is moved to get 
something to eat. Don’t be confused here: it is not that the pain 
is an unpleasant sensation which gives the animal a reason to 
eat. The animal has a reason to eat, which is that it will die if it 
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does not” (1996, 150). Thus, for Korsgaard, having a reason is 
quite independent from being capable of rational deliberation 
and from even being basically aware of it. In this example, the 
animal has a reason to eat apart from the pain, which is the 
perception of that reason. It will die if it does not eat, and this 
is what is relevant to obligation. Plants, equally, have reasons 
entailed in their principle of life.
Assuming the case has been made that plants have reasons 
and identities, then our direct duty to plants works like this: 
your biological nature is a fundamental form of your identity. 
You do not simply value your human nature, but also you value 
that nature on which your distinctly rational faculties depend: 
animal nature and more basically biological nature. Since you 
value the basic principle of life that you find within, then you are 
obligated to value the same principle in others as well, whether 
you find it in other humans, animals, or plants. To disvalue the 
principle of life in others would be to deny your own nature, to 
lose your self-identity. This shows that plants do not have value 
simply as being instrumental to our good, but they are valuable 
as having their own ends, and this is how Korsgaard’s model 
entails obligations to plants.
Korsgaard’s Response
Korsgaard would immediately reject this alleged implication 
of her argument because she says plants are not conscious and 
thus not capable of perceiving threats to their identities. She 
says, “Being a plant is not a way of being someone, so it is not 
a way of being someone that we share with them” (1996, 156). 
And this would mean that our perceiving a threat to a plant 
would not obligate us to the plant, to change its condition in any 
way, because the plant itself does not perceive a reason; it does 
not “matter to itself” in a self-conscious way.  
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That a plant does not “matter to itself” in a self-conscious 
way is an incontestable fact, but as Korsgaard says, plants mat-
ter to themselves in an unconscious teleological sense, and this 
having a reason, not the perception of a reason, seems to be the 
basis of obligation. For something to obligate us, it need only 
have a reason that we can also attribute to ourselves, which is 
to identify with it, and this is clearly what she has in mind when 
she speaks of plants having ends, which I have shown above. 
Being a conscious someone might be necessary for holding ob-
ligations yourself, but not a necessary condition for being able 
to obligate others.
Under Korsgaard’s model, plants obligate us because we 
are capable of reflecting on reasons that they have to maintain 
themselves, as having their own needs. We do not need to be 
called upon by an expression of pain to recognize these needs, 
we simply infer these needs as reasons by seeing the same prin-
ciple of life active in ourselves, and this is how we are obligated 
to plants, not just in regards to them.
Conclusion
I have attempted to show that Korsgaard’s theory of direct 
duties to animals entails direct duties to plants as well. The only 
way for Korsgaard to avoid this entailment is to abandon the 
teleological conception of life, but it is not clear that she can 
do this without ultimately undermining her case for obligations 
to animals. Another solution might be to give a more careful 
defense of why mattering to yourself or being conscious of rea-
sons is necessary to obligate others in your case, or she could 
simply embrace our having direct duties to plants, but then face 
the daunting task of answering other questions such as what 
we are to eat. I think all of these solutions are potentially vi-
able. Some might take my argument as a reductio ad absur-
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dum against Korsgaard (some think it is absurd to say that we 
have direct obligations to non-sentient life), but this is not my 
aim. I am partial to teleological conceptions of life and hopeful 
that her project can help explain the moral intuition that non-
sentient life is intrinsically valuable; however, making the full 
case for direct obligations to plants will require more work, and 
I hope that Korsgaard or someone else continues this project. 
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